The possibility of a British earned income tax credit by Robert Walker & Michael Wiseman
Fiscal Studies (1997) vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 401–425
The Possibility of a British Earned
Income Tax Credit
ROBERT WALKER and MICHAEL WISEMAN
*
Abstract
The possibility of an earned income tax credit, based on the US model, is currently high up the
British political agenda. This paper examines the strengths and weaknesses of the current British
system of in-work benefits, before reviewing the effectiveness of the US Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) scheme. The British and US systems are then directly compared in terms of the net
income delivered and the effective tax rate (net benefit deduction rate). Although the evidence in
favour of a US-style EITC is weak, two possible variants are considered. The paper concludes that
the only future for an EITC is probably as a partial scheme, linked to the amalgamation of in-work
and out-of-work benefits, which removes wage subsidisation from the sphere of social security by
means of a semi-individualised tax credit. Even so, the same goals could be achieved through the
benefit system.
JEL classification: H24, I38.
I. INTRODUCTION
Gordon Brown, the Labour Party’s first Chancellor of the Exchequer in 18 years,
used his first Budget speech to confirm that the Taylor review of the tax and
benefit system would be considering ‘at an early stage the advantages of
introducing a new in-work tax credit for low-paid workers’ based on the American
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).
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In this article, we reflect on the US experience and conclude that the success of
the EITC has been exaggerated in the British debate. Not only do fewer people
receive a net tax credit from the scheme than is typically stated, but the method
used for delivering the credit makes it more of a reward for working than a work
incentive. Moreover, were it not for the existence of the US Food Stamp Program,
the EITC scheme could not function successfully as part of a support package for
the low-paid. We also directly compare the US system with that currently in place
in Britain and conclude that the withdrawal of food stamps and other benefits,
combined with the structure of earned income tax credits, means that many low-
wage Americans still confront a significant poverty trap, shallower but wider than
in Britain. In the light of this evidence, although the case for a British EITC is
scarcely proven, two possibilities are considered. However, before doing this, we
review the context in which pressure to reform the tax and benefit system has
emerged.
II. CURRENT DISSATISFACTIONS
Despite an acute sensitivity to the work disincentive effects created by out-of-work
benefits, the reforms of the Thatcher–Major era failed to increase the
attractiveness of work over relief. While the relative and, in some cases, the real
incomes of the unemployed were reduced, this was offset by changes in the labour
market — the decline of manufacturing, abolition of the wages council system,
erosion of trade union power, growth in part-time employment, the casualisation
of employment and so on — which brought wages down as well. These
developments contributed to an unprecedented increase in wage inequality, with
wage rates at the bottom — at the level of entry and re-entry jobs — scarcely
rising at all in real terms (Gosling, Machin and Meghir, 1994). Moreover, changes
in housing subsidies — which increased the number of claimants receiving
housing benefit — the growth of owner-occupation among low-income families
(and thus expanded eligibility for council tax benefit) and higher indirect taxation
all added to work disincentives (Walker, 1994).
Ideologically averse to job-creation and other measures designed to boost
labour demand ‘artificially’, the Conservatives came increasingly to rely on
boosting in-work incomes by means of in-work benefits. Key elements in this
strategy were the introduction and later extension of family credit, aimed at
working families with children, and, more recently, the trialling of earnings top-up,
a parallel scheme for individuals and couples without children. This approach,
which developed disparate social assistance systems differentiated by the amount
of paid employment claimants were permitted to undertake, can be described either
as pioneering or as eccentric, since Britain now boasts Europe’s most extensive
system of means-tested support to the low-paid (Eardley et al., 1996).
FIGURE 1Possibility of a British EITC
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The Structure of Family Credit
Title:  fig 1
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  12/11/97 2:37 pm
Note: Family 1 has one child aged five; Family 2 has two children aged five and 12; Family 3 has two children aged
five and 12, and one of the parents works for more than 30 hours per week.
From the outset, family credit had multiple objectives: to provide extra support
for families; to ensure that they were better off in work than not; and to reduce
marginal tax (deduction) rates (Department of Health and Social Security, 1985).
Nevertheless, the structure of family credit is quite straightforward (Figure 1).
Where net family
1 weekly income is less than or equal to a set figure (the
applicable amount is £77.15 for 1997–98), a claimant receives a maximum benefit
that is determined largely on the basis of household size and composition.
2 In other
circumstances, claimants receive the maximum benefit minus 70 per cent of the
amount by which net income exceeds the applicable amount. In couples, the
benefit is typically paid to the female partner even when only the man is employed.
This last feature is inherited from family income supplement which had more
explicit family support objectives. Family credit was to have been paid to
employees through the wage packet, but this strategy was abandoned in light of
opposition to a move that would have shifted resources from ‘the handbag to the
wallet’.
Family credit was originally restricted to people working at least 24 hours per
week. The hours threshold for family credit was reduced to 16 hours in April 1992
                                                                                                                             
1Family is defined as the benefit unit comprising an adult, his or her partner and any dependent children living in the
same household. Net income for employees is income less income tax and Class 1 National Insurance contributions
and less set disregards for childcare and maintenance payments. Earnings from self-employment equate to net profit.
2Maximum benefit includes the same amount for a couple as for a single parent and varying amounts for children
according to age.Fiscal Studies
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and, as an incentive to work longer hours, higher benefit was introduced in July
1995 for people working 30 hours or more. Disregards on maintenance and
childcare costs were added in April 1992 and October 1994 respectively. Partly as
a result of these changes, the family credit caseload has risen markedly to 733,000
in February 1997 — 12 per cent of all working families with children (Figure 2).
The Conservative Government lauded family credit as a great success and
Labour in opposition did not speak against the piloting of its extension to childless
workers in the form of earnings top-up. In a number of respects, family credit does
indeed appear to work well.
Family credit provides work incentives and support for family incomes:
· family credit ensures that the vast majority of recipient families’ incomes in
work are above those when not working and hence contributes directly and
immediately to higher nominal living standards;
3
· family credit plays a major role in supporting the living standards of lone
parents in work — 44 per cent of those working 16 hours or more receive it;
                                                                                                                             
3A model couple with two children aged 5 and 12 working 40 hours at £3.94 per hour will be £21 (12 per cent)
better off, or £20 (11 per cent) better off for a 30-hour week (from Department of Social Security (1996)). Surveys
have shown that, in 1994, lone parents were as much as £39 per week better off on average, or £10 better off if
paying for childcare (Finlayson and Marsh, 1997). We refer to higher nominal standards because calculations such
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· combined with maintenance, family credit means that, on average, lone parents
in work have incomes 60 per cent above what they would receive from out-of-
work benefits;
· the system acts as a ‘parachute’, enabling two-earner couples to remain
attached to the labour market when one partner loses his or her job (Bryson and
Marsh, 1996).
Family credit limits the ‘poverty trap’:
· the effective tax rate (known more formally as the ‘marginal deduction rate’),
which is the combined result of benefit withdrawal and direct taxation, is
almost always below 100 per cent, thereby limiting the depth of the poverty
trap;
· furthermore, because family credit is assessed for six months at a time, the
impact of the poverty trap is deferred; the scheme therefore acts to provide a
short-term income guarantee and removes the immediate disincentive effects of
higher earnings.
Administration of family credit is effective:
· take-up, at 69 per cent of eligible claimants and 82 per cent of expenditure, is
very high for a means-tested benefit (Department of Social Security, 1997);
· fast-track processing systems enable nine out of 10 people moving into work to
receive benefit within five days of starting work, thereby lessening the financial
insecurity inherent in taking work and clearly connecting the reward to the
action;
· family credit provides Jobcentre staff with a mechanism to assist job-seekers
back into work and an informal test
4 that claimants are truly available for
employment.
Despite these achievements, there are also structural limitations that have
caused strategists to look abroad for alternative ideas.
Family credit is costly:
                                                                                                                             
4If an unemployed claimant declines to take work even in the knowledge that family credit may be payable,
Employment Service staff are known to interpret this as an indication that the claimant may not truly be available
for work.Fiscal Studies
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· expenditure on family credit has increased threefold in little more than four
years, and the combined expenditure would be substantially more if earnings
top-up were to be extended nation-wide;
· there are anecdotal accounts of collusion between employers and claimants to
maximise payments;
· economic theory suggests that family credit may shift part of the burden of
family support from employers to the state;
· while most family credit recipients receive payments for only short periods,
most expenditure goes to long-term recipients; hence the assertion in Labour’s
manifesto that benefits are underwriting low wages and subsidising employers
(Ashworth and Walker, 1993; Walker with Ashworth, 1994).
Traps and disincentives multiply with the interaction of family credit with
other programmes:
· the withdrawal of family credit with rising wages, combined with loss of other
means-tested in-work benefits (notably housing benefit and council tax benefit),
means that, in the longer term, families gain little financial benefit from large
increases in earnings: a couple with children aged 5 and 8 in 1996–97 gained
FIGURE 3
Net Income after Housing Costs
for Couples and Lone Parents with Two Children on Family Credit, April 1996
a
Title:  fig 3
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  12/11/97 2:39 pm
aAssumes a one- or two-parent family with a child aged under five and one aged 5–10, rent of £42.17 per week and
council tax of £12.10 per week.
Source: Derived from Department of Social Security (1996).Possibility of a British EITC
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£10 in net income from a £165 wage increase from an initial £50 per week
(Figures 3 and 4); this could mean that workers do not seek further to reduce
their reliance on state benefits;
· some people may reduce the number of hours that they work and instead rely
on family credit to make up for the loss in wages (Duncan and Giles, 1996);
· there is also new evidence (Bryson, 1997) consistent with the proposition that
family credit is encouraging people into jobs with limited prospects for career
advancement, thereby trapping them in ‘dead-end jobs’ and the state into long-
term financial support;
· the majority of short-term recipients leave benefit without work rather than
moving into better-paid jobs (Bryson and Marsh, 1996);
· family credit places the under-25s — one of the government’s target groups —
at a comparative disadvantage in the job market, since most do not have
children and cannot claim family credit’s implicit wage subsidy.
5
The system is inefficient:
                                                                                                                             
 
5It is recognised that one objective of family credit is to help meet the cost of children not experienced by childless
under-25s.
FIGURE 4
Family Credit: Net Marginal Deduction Rate, April 1996
a
Title:  fig 4
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  12/11/97 2:41 pm
aSee Figure 3 for assumptions.Fiscal Studies
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· in the system as a whole, at least some of what government gives with one hand
is taken away with the other: benefits are paid to people who at the same time
pay income tax and make National Insurance contributions: the tax threshold is
more than £30 per week less than the gross wage received by the average
claimant and about 45 per cent of people receiving family credit pay income
tax (Dilnot and Giles, 1996);
· although take-up is high, there is evidence that working families would prefer
to be free of all means-tested assistance (Kempson, 1996), and the complexity
of the system, the disjuncture between in-work and out-of-work benefits, and
the need often to claim benefits in addition to family credit undermine the
message that ‘people are better off working’ (Shaw et al., 1996).
To summarise, while family credit is effective in enhancing the living standards
of the low-paid workers who receive it, the scheme has become increasingly
expensive as a result of attempts to increase its effectiveness. Its overall
contribution to work incentives may be limited since the enhanced incentive to
start work is offset by aspects that may discourage workers from increasing
earnings through job progression or increasing hours. Furthermore, although the
administration of family credit is neither unduly complex nor costly, the
assessment and payment of benefits, taxes and wages are separated, adding to
public sector costs and lessening the incentive signals to prospective claimants.
However, given that there is little chance of being able to establish a minimum
wage at a level high enough to have much impact on the numbers of working poor,
there is likely to be a continuing need for some form of wage supplementation. To
better family credit, a new scheme would need to foster progress towards greater
financial self-sufficiency by smoothing the transition into paid employment and
encouraging higher earnings. It is also important for the new scheme to
complement and reinforce New Deal, the package of welfare-to-work measures
currently under development. In the next section, we consider how well the US
Earned Income Tax Credit meets this specification.
III. LOOKING TO AMERICA: EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
Much of the inspiration for proposals for an in-work tax credit for low-paid
workers comes from American experience with that country’s Earned Income Tax
Credit. While it is certainly true that, in the US, the EITC effects substantial
transfers of cash to low-income working families, there are significant problems
with the EITC that diminish its importance to policymaking in Britain.
1. How the American EITC Works
The EITC is an earnings supplement paid to low-income working taxpayers. First
established by Congress in 1975, the programme has since been substantiallyPossibility of a British EITC
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modified and expanded. Currently, three separate schedules apply: one for
taxpayers with no children, one for taxpayers with one child and the third for
taxpayers with two or more children (Figure 5).
In the two-child case, the credit supplements earnings at the rate of 40 cents
per dollar up to total annual earnings of $8,890 (£5,323).
6 At this point, the
taxpayer (or taxpaying couple) receives the maximum EITC credit of $3,556
(£2,129). Beyond annual earnings of $11,610 (£6,952), the credit declines at a
21.06 per cent rate until earnings reach $28,495 (£17,062).
Cast in weekly terms to aid comparisons with Britain, the maximum rate is
$68.38 (roughly £41), achieved when weekly earnings reach $171 (£102). The
benefit begins to decline at a weekly earnings rate of $223 (£134) and falls to zero
when weekly earnings reach $548 (£328). The maximum weekly benefit for
taxpayers with one child is $41.38 (£24.78); for taxpayers without children, the
maximum weekly benefit is $6.21 (£3.72). Over the range $0–171 (£0–102), the
EITC creates a substantial ‘price’ incentive for more work, for every dollar of
gross earnings gains an EITC bonus of 40 cents.
                                                                                                                             
6Based on an exchange rate of $1.67 to the pound current at the time of writing.
FIGURE 5
The US Earned Income Tax Credit, by Family Size, 1996
Title:  fig 5
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  12/11/97 2:42 pmFiscal Studies
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The EITC is currently America’s only refundable tax credit.
7 If the amount of
the credit exceeds federal income tax liability, the excess is payable as a direct
transfer. Most taxpayers file returns in the interval between 1 January and 15
April of the year following that in which tax liabilities and credit claims are
accrued. If federal taxes withheld plus EITC claims accrued (net of advanced
payments, if any) exceed federal tax liability, the difference is returned as a tax
refund. About 18 million single individuals and families receive the credit, but of
these perhaps about 2 million receive no refund, since the credit serves only to
offset partially their tax liability.
                                                                                                                             
7The Budget Bill signed by President Clinton on 5 August includes a refundable child credit of $500. Since the
administrative details of the new legislation were not available at the time of writing, we have not included the child
credit in our analyses.Possibility of a British EITC
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The EITC is costly. Table 1 summarises federal spending on various means-
tested social assistance programmes in fiscal year 1996 and shows that federal
costs for the EITC were, last year, roughly equivalent to federal outlays on Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the programme traditionally seen as
the heart of the American public assistance system. In practice, few AFDC
families report earnings; therefore most EITC benefits went to low-income
families not receiving cash assistance. Many of these families include two parents.
Families with two able-bodied parents are, in most states, eligible for assistance
only if the ‘principal wage-earner’ is unemployed or under-employed — that is,
unable to find more than 100 hours of work per month. Those working more than
100 hours are ineligible, regardless of earnings or family size. Thus, in principle,
the EITC fills an important gap in the US public assistance system.
In practice, it is not clear that the American Earned Income Tax Credit fills the
gap well at all. A long-standing concern of public assistance is to deliver benefits
TABLE 1




Family support payments (principally the federal share of costs of the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children programme)
18,371
Supplemental security income (cash payments to needy aged, blind and
disabled persons)
24,017
Child protection (federal share of costs of foster care for children
removed from or without families; related programmes)
3,840
Child nutrition (school lunch and breakfast programmes, food assistance
and nutritional screening for low-income women who are pregnant or
caring for infants)
8,428
Medicaid (federal share of costs of entitlement programme providing
medical assistance for certain low-income persons)
95,786
Food stamps (national income supplement intended to assure adequate
nutrition)
26,220
Social services block grant (grants to states to enable provision of a
broad range of social services)
2,880
Earned Income Tax Credit (earnings subsidy) 18,440
Total 197,982
Note: Fiscal year 1996 extended from 1 October 1995 to 30 September 1996. The programme coverage summaries
given here are intended to give an impression of programme substance; they do not cover all facets of the
programmes involved.
Source: Committee on Ways and Means, 1996, p. 1332 and elsewhere in the volume.Fiscal Studies
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when they are needed. The EITC hardly does this, since, to take the most extreme
case, claims established in January may not be received for 16 months. Since
1979, eligible taxpayers have been allowed to receive a portion of the credit in
advance of annual filing of tax returns; however, this option is exercised by only
about 5 per cent of claimants. The cash-flow problem that results from the lag
between generation of EITC eligibility and EITC receipt is compounded by over-
withholding of federal taxes.
8 The solution to the conundrum of how working
families make ends meet on a day-to-day basis is provided by the Food Stamp
Program.
For most families, food stamps operate like a social assistance cash benefit.
There are: a ‘guarantee’ — the amount paid to the household with no other
income, which varies by family size; a ‘disregard’ — the amount of earnings and
other work expenses that is ignored in calculating benefit; and a ‘benefit reduction
rate’ — the rate at which benefit declines as income increases. The difference
between food stamps and a cash benefit is, of course, that the payments in this
scheme are made with special vouchers (or, in a growing proportion of cases, by
use of an electronic benefits debit card) usable only for food purchases. While the
restriction nominally placed on uses of this benefit is symbolically and politically
important, dollars saved on food can be spent elsewhere. The consensus among
authorities is that, evaluated in terms of effects on household consumption, food
stamps amount to cash.
The amounts paid are not trivial. In fiscal year 1996, the maximum monthly
food stamp benefit for a family of four persons was $397,
9 while a family of the
same size with a monthly income of $1,000 would receive $197 alongside $289 in
EITC payments.
10 From the standpoint of timeliness, the key difference between
EITC and food stamps is that food stamps are issued monthly by local welfare
offices. In the US, food stamps are the most important source of immediate
income supplementation for the working poor.
2. Interactions with Tax and Other Benefits
As is true of the UK system, the American system of transfers to the poor has
many components. It is always important in assessing individual programmes —
including the EITC — to consider interactions with other benefits and taxation.
                                                                                                                             
8A very important difference between the US and UK income tax systems is that the US relies much more heavily
on the filing of end-of-year tax returns and the use of this process to reconcile accumulated tax obligations and
EITC claims. Virtually all households with earnings or other non-transfer income are required to file. In contrast,
the UK system is pay-as-you-go, with taxes on wages in each payroll period levied on the basis of accumulated
earnings over the year and earnings in the current period. Only about 20 per cent of taxpayers file annual returns.
9Benefits are reduced as income rises, but both the disregard and the benefit reduction rate are generous: the
disregard is $134 per month plus 20 per cent of earned income, and the benefit reduction rate is 30 per cent. Thus a
family of four with a monthly income of $1,000 would be eligible for $397 – 0.30(1000–134–200) = $197.
10EITC payments are not treated as income in computing food stamp benefits.Possibility of a British EITC
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This is particularly relevant when seeking to distil policy lessons for Britain from
the American system.
The effect of the EITC on spendable income is, to a varying extent, offset by
positive taxes charged against wages. Employers in the US withhold 7.65 per cent
of wages for social insurance (called Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance
(OASDI)) contributions. In addition, earnings are withheld to cover accumulated
federal income tax liability. Most low-income workers accrue no positive federal
tax liability (a four-person household would begin to owe federal taxes only when
earnings reach around $325). However, below this income ($325), taxes are
generally over-withheld, so that, as a rule of thumb, take-home pay can average
less than 90 per cent of gross earnings. This loss is experienced immediately.
Since the offsetting Earned Income Tax Credit is not generally collected until
annual tax returns are filed, in practice the EITC acts more as an end-of-year
reward than a real-time incentive for undertaking a few more hours of work.
The combined effect of federal programmes on the income of an illustrative
family of two adults and two children is depicted in Figure 6. This diagram mimics
the UK data in Figure 3 and takes account of the EITC, food stamps, OASDI
contributions and federal income tax liability.
11 Gross weekly earnings are plotted
on the horizontal axis and net income including transfers appears on the vertical.
There are three lines in the figure. One — the reference line — simply shows gross
earnings. The lower of the other two lines shows earnings plus food stamps minus
                                                                                                                             
11The impact of state support varies considerably and is discussed below.
FIGURE 6
Weekly Benefits and Earnings, accounting for Food Stamps,
with and without the EITC, for a Couple with Two Children, 1996
Title:  fig 6
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  12/11/97 2:43 pmFiscal Studies
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OASDI contributions and (for earnings beyond roughly $330 per week) federal
tax liability. This is take-home pay under the assumption that taxes withheld
match obligations exactly; as already indicated, for most workers, over-
withholding will pull this line downward. Food stamps provide a positive addition
to ‘income’ of $92 per week for families with zero earnings. The upper line that
also begins at the $92 food stamp guarantee adds the EITC to the picture. The gap
between the ‘net income’ and ‘current cash flow’ lines is the amount of the EITC,
taken from Figure 5.
The clear incentive structure associated with the EITC is modified by the
interaction with food stamps (Figure 7).
12 While the combination of the food
stamps income disregard and the EITC subsidy makes tax rates negative for low
income levels, once earnings reach $171 (the weekly earnings level for maximum
EITC payment), the marginal tax rates for the system as a whole increase
substantially. At the forthcoming minimum wage of $5.15 per hour, this is 33
hours of work — within striking range of full-time.
It is clear that, while the EITC does reduce the marginal deduction rate for low
levels of earnings, the consequence is to raise it at higher levels (Scholz, 1996;
Eissa and Leibman, 1996). Also, there is little evidence or reason to suppose that
the EITC operates as much of an immediate financial incentive to persons
receiving assistance and contemplating moving to work or for persons already
working who might be attempting to increase hours (Whitehouse, 1996). When the
EITC is ignored, marginal deduction rates for the system can still compound to as
high as 46 per cent. When the EITC is added, marginal rates for some participants
reach 68 per cent. While incentives have been improved for a subset of workers,
the cost has been a substantial increase in the deduction rates applied to earners in
the region in which the EITC falls. A report distributed in 1995 by the Office of
Tax Analysis of the US Department of the Treasury indicates that marginal tax
rates applied to workers earning at a level equal to one-half the national median
income level are now at the highest level observed over the past 50 years (Lerman,
1995).
FIGURE 7
US Marginal Deduction Rate for Food Stamps Recipients,
with and without the EITC, for a Couple with Two Children, 1996
                                                                                                                             
12Figure 7 plots the marginal deduction rate with and without the EITC. This is 1 minus the slope of the ‘net
income’ and ‘current cash flow’ lines in Figure 6.Possibility of a British EITC
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To appreciate the full effect of the American system on financial returns to
work, it is important to add Aid to Families with Dependent Children and housing
subsidies. Prior to the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, two-parent families were, in
most states, eligible for cash assistance under AFDC only if the ‘principal earner’
of the household was involuntarily working less than 100 hours per month.
PRWORA substituted ‘Temporary Assistance for Needy Families’ (TANF) for
AFDC and expanded state discretion in providing assistance in such cases.
Application of the so-called ‘100 Hours’ eligibility rule varies across states; most
have, at least for the time being, retained it. The example given in Figures 8 and 9
is based on AFDC benefit levels as provided in Wisconsin, a relatively generous
state.
13 In 1996, the basic AFDC benefit in Wisconsin for a family of four was
$617 a month; a family of three received $517. Across all 50 states and the
District of Columbia, the median benefit for a family of four was $469 in January
1996.
14
                                                                                                                             
13Nine states, including California, Massachusetts and New York, paid more. Wisconsin has a small state earned
income tax credit; the effects of including this in the comparative analysis are reported in Walker and Wiseman
(1997).
14The incentive structure under AFDC is difficult to depict in diagrams like Figures 3 and 4 since the 100-hour rule
makes benefit loss a function of hourly wage as well as of earnings. In principle, all benefits are lost when earnings
reach the amount associated with 12%100/52 = 23 hours of work per week. Moreover, under AFDC (and, in most
states, also under TANF), earnings were only disregarded for the first four months of employment. The example is
based on annual accounting and takes a four-person household in which the principal wage-earner begins
employment on 1 January. The average weekly gain from AFDC is plotted up to the point that the 100-hour rule
leads to loss of benefit. To fix this point in terms of earnings, the principal earner is assumed to earn $8.00 per hour,Fiscal Studies
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FIGURE 8
Weekly Benefits and Earnings accounting for Food Stamps, AFDC, Section 8
Housing Subsidies and Earnings, with and without the EITC,
for a Couple with Two Children, 1996
Title:  fig 8
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  12/11/97 2:44 pm
Rented housing subsidies are far less common in the US than in the UK. In
1995, only about one-fifth of all recipients of AFDC were living in federally
subsidised housing.
15 Nevertheless, since receipt of housing benefit is common in
the UK, it is appropriate in this comparison to take account of what is called a
‘Section 8’ rent subsidy. This provides the difference between 30 per cent of a
family’s income (after a small disregard) and what the US Department of Housing
and Urban Development judges to be ‘fair market rent’ in the area in which the
recipient resides.
16
Figures 8 and 9 show the result of adding AFDC and Section 8 housing
subsidies to the schedules depicted in Figures 6 and 7. The guarantee is now
greater, but the marginal deduction rate is higher as well. With or without the
EITC, the deduction rate moves beyond 100 per cent as the 100-hour threshold is
crossed. Since the position of this threshold depends on the wage rate, it will occur
at different levels of earnings for different workers, but such a threshold exists for
                                                                                                                             
an amount that would just bring the family to the poverty line were he (or, in some instances, she) to work full-time,
all year.
15This estimate was calculated from the 1995 Federal Quality Control Sample of AFDC cases.
16The fair market rent effective in Milwaukee (Wisconsin’s largest city) in 1996 for a two-bedroom apartment —
$564 per month — is used.Possibility of a British EITC
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all two-parent families. The lone-parent case, not illustrated here, lacks the 100-
hour break but, in general, exhibits the same high marginal deduction rates.
3. Comparison with the UK
The final step in investigating the American EITC and related assistance
programmes is to compare the US and UK cases directly. To do this, income and
benefits are converted to a common scale based on the median weekly earnings of
men working full-time.
17 Figure 10 combines Figure 3 (the UK income–earnings
diagram), modified to take account of income support for people working less than
16 hours per week, with Figure 8 (the US income–earnings diagram); Figure 11
does the same for Figures 4 and 9.
                                                                                                                             
17In April 1996, median earnings for full-time male employees on adult rates in the UK were £334.90. The closest
comparable data available for the US are median weekly earnings for all men 16 and older for the second quarter of
1996, $554.60. The UK data are from the 1996 New Earnings Survey. The American figure is from Employment
and Earnings, vol. 43, no. 7, July 1996, p. 151. Note that at the then current exchange rate ($1.52/£), the
American earnings level is £365, or approximately 9 per cent higher than the UK figure. At current (August 1997)
exchange rates ($1.67/£), the two figures are virtually identical. For reasons of comparability, the British data have
been recalculated on the basis of increments of £6 (rather than the £1 used in Figures 3 and 4) to correspond with
the $10 increments used in all the US analysis. All other assumptions are retained.
FIGURE 9
US Marginal Deduction Rate for Food Stamps, AFDC and Section 8 Housing
Subsidies Recipients, with and without the EITC,
for a Couple with Two Children, 1996
Title:  fig 9
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  12/11/97 2:45 pmFiscal Studies
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It is apparent that the US system, when operated in the context of a relatively
generous state, serves to achieve higher incomes than the British system for those
with earnings above 25 per cent of median earnings but is less successful at
raising the incomes of those with the lowest initial earnings. The underlying reason
is that Britain offers a more generous system — jobseeker’s allowance and
previously income support — for those who are effectively without work, but that
the US system offers more to those in low-paid employment.
18 The consequence in
terms of potential disincentives is that deduction rates in Britain are highest at the
bottom of the earnings range while those in the US peak at the 100-hour threshold
and again at around two-thirds of median earnings. Indeed, US deduction rates are
higher than those in Britain as earnings approach the median.
FIGURE 11
UK and US Comparison of Marginal Deduction Rate for All Benefits
including the EITC, for a Couple with Two Children, 1996
a
                                                                                                                             
18Differences in the tax system are also important. For the model family, the US federal income tax of 15 per cent
starts at 60 per cent of median earnings, whereas in Britain the tax rate commences at 20 per cent, with a threshold
at about 30 per cent of median earnings.
FIGURE 10
Comparison of Earnings and Incomes in the UK and US after Payment of Taxes
and Benefits, for a Couple with Two Children, 1996
a
Title:  fig10
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  12/11/97 2:47 pm
aSee Figure 3 and text for assumptions.Possibility of a British EITC
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Title:  fig11
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  12/11/97 2:48 pm
aSee Figure 3 and text for assumptions.
Finally, it must not be forgotten that this like-with-like comparison masks two
important considerations. First, only the federal food stamps and EITC
programmes are available everywhere in the US. In several states, two-adult
families are eligible for AFDC/TANF only under very restrictive conditions
(including a six-month time limit) and obtaining a Section 8 housing subsidy may
require a two-year wait. Therefore, in practice, the American system achieves
significantly lower incomes than suggested by Figure 10, although, as a
consequence, marginal deduction rates are generally noticeably lower than in
Britain (see Walker and Wiseman (1997) for further details). Second, and to
reiterate, Americans with low earnings do not receive any immediate benefit from
EITC in the short term, relying instead on food stamps for supplementary income.
4. The Emerging Critique of EITC
While the EITC programme enjoys substantial and continuing political support, it
is also widely criticised. Critics make four points, all of which are relevant to the
UK discussion.
The programme is too expensive. Between 1986 and 1996, federal spending on
the Earned Income Tax Credit increased from $1.7 billion to $18 billion; as Table
1 indicates, this rivals total federal outlays on Aid to Families with Dependent
Children. In the words of tax expert George Yin of the University of Virginia, ‘a
transfer programme of this magnitude ... shouldn’t be hidden in our tax code’
(Yin, 1996, p. 78).Fiscal Studies
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The programme is subject to excessive fraud. An Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) study of tax compliance released early in 1997 reported that taxpayers
claimed $4.4 billion more in EITC refunds for 1994 than they were eligible to
receive (Tax Notes, 1997). In response, the IRS recommended various actions and
changes in EITC law intended to combat erroneous and fraudulent claims. The
two principal compliance issues involve assuring that the work that is reported to
justify receipt of the subsidy has actually occurred and verifying that children
reported as a basis for claiming the credit are indeed in the household (Steuerle,
1997, p. 1414).
The effects on labour supply may be perverse. Since the EITC raises marginal
tax rates for more workers than get marginal tax reductions, on balance the EITC
may lower work effort. The actual consequence of the policy for labour supply is
complicated by timing of the reward. Again to quote Yin, ‘EITC benefits may be
perceived as an income tax refund, a product of the tax preparer’s ingenuity, or
simply a windfall, and not a reward for work effort. This mutes any significant
influence the programme might have on work levels’ (Yin, 1996, p. 78).
The good news arrives so late that the message is lost. As is clear from the
figures presented above, the disjuncture between earning and receiving the EITC
means that the tax reduction fails both as a reward for work and as a contribution
to family liquidity during the difficult welfare-to-work transition. A number of
experiments have been proposed in the US to use third parties — welfare agencies,
state revenue offices or community organisations — to deliver the benefit as the
claim is accrued and to integrate the EITC with other components of the transfer
system (Wiseman, 1995). Some (Steuerle, 1997) encourage third-party
participation as a method of reducing fraud and improving EITC administration;
others see it as an essential element in an integrated tax and benefit system. One
reluctant endorsement comes this way:
Sad to say, what is needed to effectively administer a programme like the
EITC is a caseworker: a person who can explain rules and choices to
potential beneficiaries, use discretion in difficult cases, and monitor the flow
of public funds ... If EITC funds were folded into the welfare funding pot,
efforts to reform welfare into a system for firmly leading recipients to work
would be easier.
(Yin, 1996, p. 79)
To date, the IRS has resisted attempts to experiment with such integration.
To summarise, there is no longer a consensus that the EITC is a sensible
addition to America’s anti-poverty programmes (Economist, 1995). The scale and
rapid growth of the programme and its susceptibility to fraud, combined with its
failure to offer demonstrable incentives or to offer low-wage-earners extra income
in the short term, have caused people to begin to look for alternatives. FewPossibility of a British EITC
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reputable commentators advocate full abolition, but people are increasingly
suggesting the need to separate support for low wages from support for children
(Steuerle, 1997) and to use some of the EITC funds to finance the work
requirements of TANF (Yin, 1996); there is, as yet, no equivalent of child benefit
in the US (but see above).
As to the direct comparison with family credit, the EITC imposes a lower
marginal deduction rate because the average benefit to families is less and the
credit is withdrawn over a comparable income range. Nevertheless, nominal
withdrawal rates approach 70 per cent when account is taken of food stamps and
rise to over 100 per cent when allowance is made for AFDC.
IV. POSSIBLE BRITISH VARIANTS
While the US experience provides no strong case for adopting an EITC in Britain,
the political momentum behind such a scheme may yet prove to be unstoppable.
After all, the Taylor Committee — if the Budget speech is to be taken literally —
is charged to consider the advantages, not the disadvantages, of an EITC. What
would such a scheme look like?
There are a number of obstacles to introducing a US-style EITC into Britain:
· the annual accounting employed by the Inland Revenue, the need to pay benefit
more frequently and the absence of a food stamps programme or its equivalent;
· the individual assessment for tax but the requirement for household (benefit
unit) assessment for needs-based payments;
· the precedent of paying money directly to the mother, thus targeting benefit
towards children even if it is her partner who is employed;
· the problem of embroiling the Inland Revenue in the assessment of need —
investigating, for example, whether or not a couple is cohabiting.
The last problem may be the most serious. The Inland Revenue’s concept of
the ‘ability to pay’, for example, is more rough and ready than the needs-based
formulations inherent in social security. Because of the divergent objectives, time
scales, systems and expertise of the Inland Revenue and of the Benefits Agency, a
full merger of tax and social security is probably as undesirable as it is
unworkable. Indeed, such differences cannot be ignored even when considering a
more limited scheme to replace family credit. For so long as the principal objective
of wage supplementation is to compensate for wages that are inadequate to sustain
families’ needs, rather than simply and solely to enhance work incentives, there is
a strong case for leaving the details of family assessment in the hands of the
Department of Social Security, or perhaps a specialist agency, rather than passing
responsibility to the Inland Revenue or employers.Fiscal Studies
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1. A Full Earned Income Tax Credit
Unfortunately, what may be the neatest strategy, which involves employers
providing a tax rebate based upon certification provided by the DSS, clears only
three of the four obstacles.
19 Such a scheme would entail the Benefits Agency
calculating entitlement to a credit which would be offset against National
Insurance contributions and/or income tax: some claimants would simply pay less
in tax or contributions but most would receive a positive credit with the weekly
wage packet or monthly salary slip. The scheme would be analogous to statutory
maternity pay in the way that employers deduct the payment from their monthly
remittance to the Inland Revenue, although they would play no role in calculating
the amount of tax credit.
How much importance is attached to the unresolved problem of the intra-
familial transfer from handbag to wallet inherent in this scheme depends on the
weight given to targeting the benefit on children. If this is considered to be
paramount, as reluctantly it was in 1985 long before the appointment of a Minister
for Women, family credit may need to be retained (though see below). But there
could be other difficulties too. One is take-up. Even though the benefit is received
through the pay packet as a tax credit — itself a positive change, clearly signalling
the true value of working — the fact that the benefit is assessed by the Benefits
Agency may confer stigma, eroding the sense of self-sufficiency. If so, one
strategy might be to create a separate agency, perhaps badged as a special section
of the Inland Revenue but staffed with specialists in needs assessment. But this
still does not obviate the need for people both to recognise the value of a tax credit
and to apply for it.
Another complication is the short-term nature of some employment. About a
third of people who move off unemployment-related benefits re-claim within six
months, while 44 per cent of family credit recipients change jobs within six to
eight months of a claim (Bryson and Marsh, 1996). Currently, claimants retain
their family credit as they move from employer to employer for the duration of the
six-month eligibility period (after which, of course, they have to make another
claim). While this system could be retained under a tax credit system by adding
the credit code to employees’ P45s, the more integrated the tax and benefit
systems, the more difficult this would prove to be.
20
                                                                                                                             
19Meadows (1997) lists three other options. In one, the Inland Revenue assesses information on taxable income and
family circumstances and informs employers of the appropriate tax code (schedule) to apply for eligible employees;
in the second, responsibility for collecting family and household information from all employees is given to
employers who would pass it along to the Inland Revenue; while, in the third, employers only collect this
information from people with earnings that fall in a qualifying zone and then calculate the credit payable on the
basis of a manual or computer program.
20An employment credit could be conceptualised as a social security benefit paid through the tax system. In this
case, it would not matter if, at year-end, credit payments did not tally with the tax position because of variations in
earnings that were ignored in the calculation of the employment credit. However, if the credit were treated as a taxPossibility of a British EITC
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A final, perhaps insuperable, problem is created by the concentration of low-
paid jobs among small employers. Given that only 38 per cent of the labour force
have dependent children and just 3 per cent receive family credit, most employers
should have no difficulty paying positive credits from the tax deducted from wages
paid to their labour forces. Nevertheless, some small employers, paying low
wages, will require supplementation from the Inland Revenue. While mechanisms
already exist for the Inland Revenue to make rebates, these are quite cumbersome
and delays could have a fatal impact on employers’ cash flows.
21 Similar, though
inevitably more complex, problems would arise for the self-employed.
Substantially to eradicate the problem would probably entail the Inland Revenue,
or the assessment agency, directly mailing credits to recipients but it is not
altogether clear how this would improve on family credit.
2. A Partial Earned Income Tax Credit
However, if there is a principled commitment to introducing an earnings tax credit,
despite the practical difficulties and evidence of limited success in the US, there
may be value in considering dividing the cost of wage subsidisation between the
tax and benefit systems and separating family support from support of wages.
Such a scheme might have three elements: an out-of-work benefit, probably
similar to jobseeker’s allowance but with no dependency additions; a parental
responsibility benefit, combining the dependency elements from jobseeker’s
allowance and family credit and paid on an income-tested basis irrespective of the
work status of either parent;
22 and a family employment credit paid to one earner
in low-income families. The pragmatic attraction of such a proposal is that the
amount of earnings credit would be much reduced, with the probability that
virtually all employers would be able to add the credit to wage packets without
needing a rebate from the Inland Revenue. Although the credit would be
comparatively small, the financial incentive would be clear and it would be
realised on the pay cheque: a net wage inflated by a tax credit compared with an
individualised out-of-work benefit. The prominent recognition given to
government’s contribution to meeting the costs of parenting — which would
generally be paid to mothers — is a further attraction of the scheme.
Most of the limitations of the strategy arise from complex administration. To
minimise this, joint assessment would be required for couples, but the logic of the
scheme would demand separate giros to be paid to the main breadwinner and
partner. Moreover, it would be appropriate to let couples choose to whom each
benefit is paid. A further problem is the disjuncture between the out-of-work
                                                                                                                             
refund or negative tax, employment credit would need to be assessed with each change of employer (or, indeed, each
change in wage rate) or be subject to an end-of-year reconciliation.
21To speed this process, rebates would need to be subject to audit after payment by the Inland Revenue.
22One could envisage the same system operating for lone parents and child benefit being retained in its current form
(i.e. assumed to be in payment when fixing scale rates for income-tested benefits).Fiscal Studies
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benefit and employment credit, even though the parental responsibility benefit
crosses the employment divide. This raises the spectre of the principal wage-earner
having to claim the credit on starting work and his or her partner being reassessed
through a different mechanism. If, however, the earnings credit were
individualised,
23 with all dependency additions absorbed into the parental
responsibility benefit, then the only information needed by the employer to
implement the scheme would be confirmation that the employee had family
responsibilities and that no credit was being claimed by his or her partner. Fraud-
resistant certification by the Benefits Agency or a combined employment and
benefits agency would be required.
V. REFLECTIONS
The low-wage sector in Britain, as in the US, has expanded so much that some
form of wage supplementation is inevitable. Without it, families in work could not
make ends meet or might not be prepared to work. The libertarian solution of
lowering benefits would simply create mass destitution. To alleviate the problem
by means of a high minimum wage would require wages to be pinned at such a
level that the benefits would almost certainly be far outweighed by increased
unemployment.
The existing system of family credit has strengths but also weaknesses.
However, the US Earned Income Tax Credit is similarly flawed and offers few
advantages. Yes, the US system does seem to leave working families with higher
net incomes than in Britain but this is primarily because of lower income taxes and
higher tax thresholds, not because of the EITC. Benefit withdrawal in the US
creates high effective tax rates that, for a family of four, are even higher than in
Britain with wages above 60 per cent of the median. Where effective tax rates are
lower in the US than in Britain, this is partly because the American system
delivers less family support, leaving people with the lowest incomes worse off than
in Britain.
So what is to be done? A full EITC scores by reducing the apparent churning
and by promoting independence from benefit. It might also be possible to spend
more on supplementing wages: even a Labour Chancellor might find it easier to
announce tax cuts than increases in benefits. But finding a realistic mode of
implementation is not easy. An EITC would do little to tackle the poverty trap or,
more especially, to bridge the very real gulf between the worlds of unemployment
and work that characterises the current system. Also, it would only support the
aims of Labour’s New Deal welfare-to-work policies in a benign, passive way by
ensuring that people were better off in employment.
                                                                                                                             
23The term ‘individualised’ denotes only that payment is made to one individual in the household. Assessment of
entitlement remains on a household basis.Possibility of a British EITC
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Perhaps the only future for an EITC is as a partial scheme, linked to the
amalgamation of in-work and out-of-work benefits, which removes wage
subsidisation from the sphere of social security by means of an individualised tax
credit. A tripartite system — comprising the tax credit and out-of-work and
parental responsibility benefits — might have something to commend it. Certainly,
New Deal policies can only yield maximum dividends if they are supported by a
benefit system that more adequately bridges the employment divide and reflects the
flexibility inherent in the modern labour market. Indeed, providing a benefit
system that systematically rewards steps into work, however tentative
circumstances may force them to be, empowers both unemployed people and their
employment advisers. But all of this could be achieved by making the
individualised tax credit an individualised benefit instead. Heads it will be, tails it
will not.
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